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JURY TRIALS FOR JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN VIRGINIA
The United States Supreme Court in In re Gault' held that the Due
Process Clause requires the application of "the essentials of due process
and fair treatment,"2 during a juvenile hearing. However, this does
not require that a juvenile hearing conform to all the requirements of
a criminal trial.3 Among those essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment which must be accorded juveniles are right to notice of the
charges, right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and
a determination based on sworn testimony.4 It has also recently been
held that the quantum of proof required in juvenile proceedings is that
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.5 The Court has had the question
before it of whether a jury trial is an essential of due process to which
a juvenile is entitled. The Court, at that time, refused to decide the
issue on policy grounds, as the case had arisen prior to the Court's
earlier determination that a jury trial was required of states under the
fourteenth amendment.6 However, certiorari has again been granted
in a case which raises the jury trial for juveniles issue and which over-
comes the earlier obstacle.7
In granting juveniles certain rights, the Court rejected the "'civil'
label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings"
as a reason for holding the Due Process Clause inapplicable to juvenile
proceedings.8 However, the Court has not rejected the basic premise
that juvenile proceedings are civil; it has only stated that such a classi-
fication does not obviate the need for due process.9 Although generally
1387 U.S. 1 (1967).
21d. at go.
Iln re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
'In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash. 2d 263, 438 P.2d
205 (1968).
51n re Winship, go S. Ct. io68 (197o).
aleBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28 (1969). In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968), and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), the Court had previously decided
that a jury trial was a fundamental concept of ordered liberty and thus was required
of the states in criminal actions by virtue of the fourteenth amendment. But, in
DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), the Court determined that Duncan and
Bloom were to be given prospective ruling only. Since the juvenile delinquency
adjudication in DeBacker arose prior to Duncan and Bloom, the holdings in those
cases were inapplicable.
71 n re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1o36
(1970). Since the adjudication in In re Burrus arose subsequent to Duncan and
Bloom, it satisfies the Supreme Court's earlier objection in DeBacker.
"in re Gault, 387 U.. 1 (1967).
gCompare In re Winship, 90 S.Ct. io68 (197o), with In re Gault, 387 US. 1
(1967).
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characterized as civil, juvenile proceedings have occasionally been held
to be criminal,' 0 quasi-criminal," and sui generis.12 Because of the vari-
ous characterizations and treatments given to juvenile proceedings, as-
certainment of statutory and constitutional rights of juveniles is diffi-
cult. In Virginia the proceeding is expressly stated not to be a criminal
one and is apparently treated as a civil proceeding.' 3 Such a characteri-
zation, not as yet rejected by the United States Supreme Court,14 is cru-
cial to the issue of a juvenile's right to a jury under the Virginia Con-
stitution.
In Virginia juveniles are granted a jury trial by statute only on ap-
peal, if at all.' 5 Neither denying a jury to juveniles nor permitting a
jury only on appeal appears to violate the Virginia Constitution. Ju-
venile proceedings, classified as civil, would fall within the guaranty
of Article I, section 11 of the Virginia Constitution. 6 However, article
I, section ii guarantees the right to a jury trial only as it existed at
common law at the time of the adoption of the Virginia Constitution.
17
Juveniles were tried as criminals at common law and juvenile delin-
quency proceedings were unknown. Juvenile proceedings are purely
statutory proceedings and were enacted after the adoption of the
Virginia Constitution.'8 Therefore, article I, section 1 1 would not ap-
pear to require that juveniles be given a jury trial.19 It also appears that
'0Cf. In re Urbasek, 38 111. 2d 585, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1968).
"See In re Winship, go S.Ct. io68, 1070 (1970).
"State v. Santana, 444 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. 1969), vacated, 397 U.S. 596 (1970).
'WA. CoDE ANN. § 16.1-179 (Supp. 197o) provides:
Except as otherwise provided, no adjudication or judgment
upon the status of any child under the provisions of this law shall
operate to impose any of the disabilities ordinarily imposed by con-
viction for a crime, nor shall any such child be denominated a
criminal by reason of any such adjudication, nor shall such ad-
judication be denominated a conviction.
See Kiracofe v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 833, 97 S.E.2d 14 (1957); Jones v. Common-
wealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946).
"4See Shone v. State, 237 A.2d 412 (Me. 1968) (noting that the United States
Supreme Court had not rejected the civil characterization of juvenile proceedings).
'WA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-214 (Supp. 1970).
'WA. CONSr. art. I, § 11 provides:
That no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property
without due process of law....
That in controversies respecting property, and in suits be-
tween man and man, trial by jury is preferable to any other, and
ought to be held sacred....
"Bowman v. State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 1o5 S.E. 141 (1920).
'Ch. 350 § 8 [1914] Va. Acts 700. See Cradle v. Peyton, 208 Va. 243, 156 S.E.2d
874 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 945 (1968).
"See Ragsdale v. City of Danville, 116 Va. 484, 82 S.E. 77 (1914). See generally
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3o U.S. 1 (1937); Ex parte Sharp, 15
Idaho 120, 96 P. 563 (i9o8); Pugh v. Bowden, 54 Fla. 302, 45 So. 499 (1907) •
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the legislature may have made juvenile proceedings cases in equity.20
If juvnile proceedings are equitable, article I, section 11 would clearly
not require jury trials for juveniles since the guaranty of this article
is inapplicable to equity proceedings.21
However, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals may have modi-
fied the constitutional result where juvenile proceedings are treated
as equitable or as coming within the guaranty of Article I, section ii.
In Mickens v. Commonwealth22 it was held that the juvenile courts
were the "other inferior tribunals" referred to in article I, section 8 of
the Virginia Constitution. 23 Such a holding would bring juvenile pro-
ceedings within the jury provision of article I, section 8 rather than
article I, section 11. However, the case was on appeal from a conviction
in the circuit court of an aggravated felony. The juvenile court had
not adjudicated the juvenile a delinquent, but merely certified him to
the circuit court as capable of standing trial as an adult.24 Thus the
court's statement concering the status of juvenile courts was dicta and
arguably resulted from a failure to note the civil-criminal distinction.
On the other hand, the court may have intended to hold that manifestly
a juvenile proceeding was criminal. If that was the case the court was
ostensibly relegating a juvenile commitment of delinquency to that class
of common law offenses termed petty crimes which were triable without
a jury in the first instance.25 However, petty crimes are triable by a jury
on appeal. If Mickens were to be strictly followed so as to bring juvenile
courts under article I, section 8, juveniles would be entitled to a jury
trial. It would be permissable to allow the jury trial for the first time
on appeal.
26
OnSee VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-214 (Supp. 1970).
"W. S. Forbes & Co. v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 13o Va. 245, 1O8 S.E. 15 (1921).
"178 Va. 273, 16 S.E.2d 641, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 69o (1941).
'VA. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides in part:
Laws may be enacted providing for the trial of offenses not
felonious by a justice of the peace or other inferior tribunal with-
out a jury, preserving the right of the accused to an appeal and
a trial by jury in some court of record having original criminal
jurisdiction.
2VA. CODE ANN. § 161-176 (Supp. 1970) provides that the juvenile court must
certify a juvenile as capable of standing trial as an adult before a circuit court
may proceed against him as a criminal.
"See generally Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888); Brown v. Epps, 91 Va.
726, 21 S.E. 119 (1895).
"Compare Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899), and Bowman v. State
Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 1o5 S.E. 141 (1920), with Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540
(1888), and Brown v. Epps, 91 Va. 726, 21 S.E. l19 (i895). The Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals has held that a jury need not be accorded in the first instance in
a criminal proceeding. Gaskill v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 486, 144 S.E.ad 293
(1965). However, the decision was rendered before Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
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If juveniles are given a jury trial it is pursuant to VA. CODE ANN.
Section i6.1-214 (Supp. 1970) which provides:
From any final order or judgment of the juvenile court af-
fecting the rights or interests of any person under the age of
eighteen years coming within its jurisdiction, an appeal may be
taken within ten days by any person aggrieved to the circuit,
corporation, or hustings court having equity jurisdiction of such
city or county....
Proceedings in juvenile cases in such courts shall conform to
the equity practice where evidence is taken ore tenus; provided,
however, that an issue out of chancery may be had as a matter
of right upon the request of either party .... 27
Whether section 16.1-214 provides for jury trials for juveniles is un-
clear. Under Virginia's first juvenile code enacted in 1914, a jury trial
was provided for on appeal. Appeals from juvenile courts were taken
in the same manner as appeals from any final order of a police justice
or justice of the peace.2 8 Appeals in such courts were had as a matter
of right to a court with original common law jurisdiction,2 9 where a
jury trial could be had on request30 In 1922 these provisions were
changed, and it was provided that juvenile appeals were to be taken
in the manner now provided for in section 16.1-214.31 Appeals pur-
suant to section 16.1-214 are taken into equity where a jury is generally
not provided.8 2 By so providing, the legislature may have intended to
deprive juveniles of their previously enjoyed right to a jury trial. Con-
versely, the legislature may have wanted to retain jury trials for juve-
146 (1968), which held that jury trials in criminal cases were required of the states
by virtue of the fourteenth amendment. The court in Gaskill discussed the problem
in relation to Palko v. Connecticut, 3o2 U.S. 319 (1937), which held that jury
trials were not a prerequisite to the rendition of justice and thus not required
of the states by the Due Process Clause. Presumably Duncan incorported the
Callan holding to the effect that a jury must be granted in the first instance in
criminal proceedings, and therefore overturned Gaskill. If the United States
Supreme Court in In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), cert. granted,
397 U.S. 1o36 (197o), holds that essentials of due process require that a juvenile be
given a jury trial, Callan may again be incorporated to require such a trial in
the first instance. In view of the fact that juvenile commitments are for an inde-
terminate period, the petty-criminal classification of delinquency might not
operate to allow a jury only on appeal. See Mickens v. Commonwealth, 178 Va.
273, 16 S.E.2d 641, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 69o (1941).
2'Emphasis added.
"Ch. 350, § 8 [1914] Va. Acts 700.
-9Ch. 142, § 12(1), [1914] Va. Acts 232.
2Ch. 100, §§ 15-18, [1872-1873] Va. Acts 83-84.
31Ch. 481, § 1920 [1922] Va. Acts 829.
3See, e.g., Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
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niles on appeal by providing that an issue out of chancery was a matter
of right, while preserving the confidentiality of the proceeding.33
The construction of "issue out of chancery as a matter of right"
determines whether the right to a jury was revoked or preserved. Issue
out of chancery as a matter of right is a new procedure not previously
provided for in equity courts. Traditionally an issue out of chancery
was granted, not as a matter of right, but in the discretion of the chan-
cellor.34 The purpose of an issue out of chancery was to satisfy the
chancellor's conscience on any doubtful issue of fact, by having a jury
decide upon the issue.35 Where the chancellor was in doubt as to the
issue of fact, originally he framed the issue and sent it out to a common
law court for trial.36 The common law court through judicial comity
certified the jury verdict back to the chancellor. In such cases the jury's
verdict, though usually followed,37 was advisory only and not binding
3In construing a statutory mandate, the primary object is to ascertain the
legislative intent. Watkins v. Hall, 161 Va. 924, 172 S.E. 445 (1934); Fairbanks,
Morse & Co. v. Town of Cape Charles, 144 Va. 56, 131 S.E. 437 (1926). Where the
legislative intent is unclear, resort must be had to rules of statutory constructioni
in interpreting the statute. Under the rules of construction it would seem that
the legislature's intent was to preserve a jury trial on appeal. Revisors of statutes
are presumed not to change the law, if the language which they use fairly admits
of a construction which makes it consistent with the former statutes. Keister's
Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs., 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918).
*4See, e.g., Stevens v. Duckett, io7 Va. 17, 57 S.E. 6oi (1907); Hogan v. Leeper,
37 Okla. 655, 133 P. 190 (1913).
MCatron v. Norton Hardware Co., 123 Va. 380, 96 S.E. 853 (1918); Carter v.
Carter, 82 Va. 624 (1886); Crebs v. Jones, 79 Va. 381 (1884). The court may direct
an issue on a single fact or all the matters in dispute, and though it is improper
to submit an issue of law, submission of a mixed question of law and fact is
permissable. See Kohn v. McNulta, 147 U.S. 238 (1893). A juvenile hearing is not
strictly an equitable proceeding in that it is usually based upon the violation of
a criminal statute and proceedings must satisfy some of the criminal due process
requirements. Issues out of chancery are appropriate in all legal causes of action.
Fischer v. Carrol, 46 N.C. 27 (1853). Thus, an issue out of chancery would seem to
be proper in a juvenile proceeding.
-11E. MEADE, LILE's EQUITY PLEADING AND PRAarICE, § 254 (3d ed. 1952) (herein-
after cited as E. MEADE). In Virginia the same court exercises both law and equity
jurisdiction and therefore the issues are tried before the chancellor himself. It is
immaterial whether the chancellor is sitting on the law or chancery side of the court.
- 3The right to a jury trial is jealously guarded and there is a general belief
that the best way to ascertain facts is through a jury trial. See Baylis v. Traveller's
Ins. Co., 113 U.S. 316 (1885); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENr
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCITY 95
(1967) [hereinafter cited as THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION]. The Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals has held that the chancellor should abide by the verdict unless
good cause appears to the contrary, and where the chancellor has found contrary
to the verdict the question on appeal is whether the evidence preponderates in
favor of the jury's or the chancellor's verdict. De Jarnette v. Thomas M. Brooks
Lumber Co., 199 Va. 18, 97 S.E.2d 750 (1957); Bunkley v. Commonwealth, 130 Va.
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on the chancellor.38 When the legislature provided that either party
could have an issue out of chancery as a matter of right, it enacted an
ambiguous, seemingly contradictory procedure. An issue out of chan-
cery was directed only in the discretion of the chancellor, and under
section 16.1-214 the chancellor's discretion is no longer the sole deter-
mining factor as to when an issue will be directed out of chancery.
The procedure in section 16.1-214 is, therefore, somewhat analogous
to issue on a plea,39 in that both may be had as a matter of right. Issue
on a plea is a procedure similar to issue out of chancery except that
the chancellor is directed by statute to submit the issue to a jury.4 0
Issue on a plea is available in a more limited situation than issue out of
chancery, 41 and when the issue is submitted, the verdict of the jury is
binding on the chancellor.42
By providing for "issue out of chancery" and providing for it "as a
matter of right" it seems that section 16.1-214 has combined characteris-
tics of issue out of chancery and issue on a plea. The situations in which
an issue may be submitted to a jury are expanded by this combina-
tion to a larger number than would be available under either proce-
dure alone. Since the phrase "issue out of chancery" was specifically
used in section 16.1-214, impliedly an issue need not meet the strict
requirements of issue on a plea43 to be submitted to a jury. This would
allow the submission of an issue in any case where the facts were doubt-
ful. However, providing that the issue is a matter of right expands the
55, 1o8 S.E. I (1921). On the other hand, the chancellor cannot rubber stamp the
jury's verdict. A decree in equity results from the chancellor's discretion, and there-
fore the chancellor must decide the case for himself though aided by the jury
verdict. Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U.S. (2o Wall.) 670 (1874). See Catron v. Norton
Hardware Co., 123 Va. 38o, 96 S.E. 853 (1918).
nJury verdicts on issues out of chancery are advisory only and serve merely
to satisfy the conscience of the chancellor. Fitchette v. Cape Charles Bank, Inc., 146
Va. 715, 133 S.E. 492 (1926); Hull v. Watts, 95 Va. 1o, 27 S.E. 829 (1897). The
chancellor need not formally set aside the jury's verdict, but may disregard it
and enter a non-conforming verdict. Idaho & Oregon Land Improvement Co. v.
Bradbury, 132 U.S. 509 (1889). He also need not grant a new issue on the basis of
errors committed on the trial of the issue. Since the ultimate decree rests with the
chancellor, he may enter a verdict in accord with the jury determination if he
feels the result would or should be the same. Watt v. Starke, 1o1 U.S. 247 (i88o).
3ODefense by plea is used in equity when the defendant desires to present a
single state of facts as a defense to the plaintiff's suit. Illustrations of the use of a
plea are: the statute of limitaiions, res judicata, and usury. E. MEADE, § i99. Where
the plaintiff takes issue on the plea rather than amending the bill to avoid it,
either party is entitled to have the issue determined by a jury. E. MEADE, § 206.
'OVA. CODE ANN. § 8-213 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
,"See E. MEADE, § 199; note 40 supra.
42See, e.g., Phillips v. Wells, 147 Va. o3o, 133 S.E. 581 (1926); Towson v.
Towson, 126 Va. 640, 102 S.E. 48 (1920).
"See E. MEADE, § 199.
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coverage of section 16.1-214 even further. The one previous require-
ment to obtain an issue out of chancery-that the case be doubtful-
is eliminated where a statute provides for direction of an issue as a
matter of right.44 In acting according to the statutory mandate45 a
chancellor must evidently submit to the jury an issue of fact when
either party so requests. 46
The extent to which the jury trial provided for in section 16.1-214
accords to juveniles those rights customary in criminal jury trial de-
pends on the way in which issues may be framed for the jury. An issue
out of chancery must be submitted in a form similar to a special inter-
rogatory, requiring either an affirmative or negative answer and pre-
cluding a general verdict.47 Since the jury determination in Section
16.1-214 is in the nature of a special verdict, the juvenile is not granted
"Beverly v. Rhodes, 86 Va. 415, 10 S.E. 572 (iS8g). See Keagy v. Trout, 85 Va.
390, 7 S.E. 329 (1888); Moseley v. Brown, 76 Va. 419 (1882).
4sCf. Fitchette v. Cape Charles Bank, Inc., 146 Va. 715, 133 S.E. 492 (1926).
"Under traditional equity principles, a chancellor could send an issue out of
chancery on every doubtful issue of fact. See Jones v. Buckingham Slate Co., 16
Va. 1o, 81 S.E. 28 (1914) (which along with Carter v. Jeffries, 11o Va. 735, 67 S.E.
284 (191o), gives examples of the form of an issue). It is unclear whether or not
§ 16.1-214 limits the right to an issue out of chancery to a single issue of fact by
providing that a party may have "an" issue, and if so limited, how broad an
issue of fact it may be.
'7Compare Doss v. Tyack, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 189 (1852); with Hulley v. Chedic,
22 Nev. 127, 36 P. 783 (1894), and Scarbrough v. Isham, 29 Tenn. App. 216, 196
S.W._d 73 (1946). Since under § 16.1-214 only those issues requested to be directed
out of chancery have to be submitted, the issues need not encompass all material
issues as for a special verdict. See United States v. Esnault-Pelterie, 299 U.S. 201
(1936). However, the issue must be so framed as to embrace the contemplated object.
That is, the issue must be stated so that the jury will have to decide on all the
facts necessary to a determination on the issue directed out of chancery. Carter
v. Campbell, 3 Va. (Gilm.) 159 (18o); Braxton v. Willing, Morris & Co., 8 Va. (4
Call) 288 (1795)-
Since a jury does not decide issues of law but only issues of fact, an issue out
of chancery is analogous to a special verdict in a proceeding at law. Were jury
trials held to be mandatory for juveniles under federal due process or section 8
of the Virginia Constitution, the statute would not appear to be invalid for the
reason that it provides for a special as opposed to a general verdict. Special verdicts
are used in some state criminal cases, and they were not unknown in criminal cases
at common law. Compare United States v. Noble, 155 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1946),
with State v. Ellis, 262 N.C. 446, 137 S.E.2d 840 (1964). The constitutional right to
a jury has also been held to be the right to have a jury decide issues of fact only.
In re Martin, 16 F. Cas. 881 (No. 9154) (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 18-).
Even though a special verdict is not constitutionally objectionable, the mere
fact that a chancery court may on occassion summon a jury to try an issue of fact
is not the equivalent of trial by jury. Cates v. Allen, 149 U.S. 451 (1893). Whether
providing that the chancellor must submit the issue to the jury, as under § 16.1-214,
is equivalent to a jury trial is arguable.
1971]
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a jury trial in the same sense as in a criminal trial48 where the jury
applies the law to the facts in arriving at its verdict and also sets the
length of confinement.4 9 In precluding the jury from deciding questions
of law50 the submission of an issue to the jury of whether or not a
juvenile is "delinquent" is prohibited, because an adjudication of
delinquency involves a mixed question of law and fact. 'It would also
be improper to frame the issue in terms of guilt or innocence, because
juvenile proceedings cannot be for the trial and punishment of
crimes.51 However, where the juvenile is within the court's jurisdiction
for the violation of a statute or ordinance, the issue would properly
be phrased in terms of whether the juvenile committed each of the acts
necessary to constitute a violation of the statute.52 The framing of
issues of fact for the jury would certainly be more difficult where the
juvenile is before the court as being neglected or dependent5
3
Although the jury trial provided by section 16.1-214 is not strictly
like that in a criminal case, it appears that under this equity procedure
the juvenile is entitled to have the jury's determination of the facts
given conclusive effect. 54 Traditionally when the issue out of chancery
"sCf. United States v. Noble, 155 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1946); State v. Ellis, 262 N.C.
446, 137 S.E.2d 84o (1964).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-178 (Supp. 1970) provides that a commitment to the
State Board of Welfare and Institutions is indeterminate in length.
r'It is improper to submit a question of law to the jury in issue out of chancery.
See Apache State Bank v. Daniels, 32 Okla. 121, 121 P. 237 (1911).
"Mickens v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 273, 16 S.E.2d 641, cert. denied, 314 U.S.
690 (1941).
17rraditionally an issue out of chancery was directed in the chancellor's discre-
tion, either on his own motion or on the motion of one of the parties. Stevens
v. Duckett, io7 Va. 17, 57 S.E. 6oi (19o7); Hogan v. Leeper, 37 Okla. 655, 13 P.
190 (1913). Presumably the chancellor still has final control over the form and
wording used in an issue out of chancery pursuant to § 16.1-214. See Jones v.
Buckingham Slate Co., 116 Va. 12o, 81 S.E. 28 (1914).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-158(1) (Supp. 1970) provides that the juvenile court has
jurisdiction over the custody of a child where he is abandoned, unsupported, with-
out parental care, or is engaged in conduct injurious to his welfare. It would
seem that these conditions would be especially hard to frame as factual issues
because of looseness of the statutory definitions. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUsTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 38 (1967) (hereinafter cited as THE PREsIDENT's
COMMISSION, TASK FORCE REPORT).
"Not only would the jury's determination appear to give conclusive effect on
the particular fact submitted to the jury, but it would appear to be conclusive in
regard to the nature of the proceeding. The chancellor, unlike the juvenile court
judge, is not in a position where he can commit a juvenile as being dependent or
neglected even though a determination has been made that the juvenile has not
violated a statute or ordinance. This is because on appeal the social report
required in VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-164 for the juvenile court is "made available only
to the court and the attorney for the defendant after the guilt or innocence of the
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was directed in the discretion of the chancellor, the jury verdict was
purely advisory.s5 However, where the chancellor has been directed by
statute to submit an issue to a jury, as in section 16.1-214, it is gener-
ally binding on the chancellor. 56 Since section 16. 1-214 provides that an
issue out of chancery is granted as a matter of right, by analogy the
chancellor would treat the verdict as binding.5 7 Otherwise, the chan-
cellor could do after a jury verdict what the legislature instructed him
not to do before direction of the issue. The legislature instructed that
where either party demanded it, the chancellor was not to decide the
issue according to his own conscience but submit the issue to a jury. By
disregarding the jury verdict the chancellor would be going against
what might be the legislature's intent of having the issues of fact de-
cided by a jury.58 On the other hand, the legislature specifically used
"issue out of chancery." Thus the legislature arguably desired that the
chancellor make the ultimate decision according to his own conscience
after having been advised by a jury.
Section 16.1-214 also poses problems in that the equity procedure
involved must be adapted in order to accord juveniles the other delin-
accused has been determined." VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-214 (Supp. 1970) (emphasis
added).
This provision requires differentiation between the adjudicatory and disposi-
tional stages of the hearing and therefore provides for a bifurcated system on appeal.
Such a system has been continuously recommended and should be retained in any
statutory revision. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMIssION, TASK FORcE REPORT 35.
55Fitchette v. Cape Charles Bank, Inc., 146 Va. 715, 133 S.E. 492 (1926); Hull
v. Watts, 95 Va. io, 27 S.E. 829 (1897).
MFor example, the verdict of a jury on an issue on a plea is binding on the
chancellor to the same extent a jury verdict is binding on the court in any legal
cause of action. Towson v. Towson, 126 Va. 640, 1o2 S.E. 48 (1920). This is because
the chancellor must act in obedience to the statutory mandate and not in exercising
any of the ordinary equity powers. The legislative mandate qualifies the chan-
cellor's ordinary power to decide the case strictly according to his own conscience.
Fitchette v. Cape Charles Bank, Inc., 146 Va. 715, 133 S.E. 492 (1926). This same
reasoning has also been used to require the chancellor to follow the jury's verdict
on an issue devisavit vel non-where the equity probate court certifies the issue to
a jury of whether the testator executed the will in question. Compare Hartman v.
Strickler, 82 Va. 225 (1886), with McGlothlin v. Keen, 140 Va. 84, 124 S.E. 451
(1924). The result is also similar in equity proceedings to quiet title. See Bath
Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Back Creek Mountain Corp., 140 Va. 280, 125 S.E. 213
(1924); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-153 (Repl. Vol. 1969).
"The chancellor would still be able to set aside for good cause the verdict
of the jury on an issue out of chancery and direct a new issue. See Meade v.
Meade, i1 Va. 451, 69 S.E. 330 (191o); Repass v. Richmond, 99 Va. 5o8, 39 S.E.
i6o (19o1); Pleasants, Shore & Co. v. Ross, i Va. (i Wash.) 197 (1793).
r'Treating the verdict as binding would be consistent with principles of statutory
construction in that it would give meaning to "as a matter of right." Courts are
bound, if possible, to give effect to every sentence, clause, or word contained in a
statute. King v. Empire Collieries Co., 148 Va. 585, 139 S.E. 478 (1927).
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eated due process rights.59 For instance, the quantum of proof for ap-
peals must be altered from the traditional equitable standard of pre-
ponderance of the evidence.6 0 In 1946 the Virignia Supreme Court of
Appeals held that the adjudication of delinquency was too serious a
reflection upon character to be allowed except where "proven by evi-
dence which leaves no reasonable doubt." 6' The United States Supreme
Court has also recently held in accord with the Virginia Court that
adjudications in juvenile courts must be based on a quantum of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.6 2 Thus where an issue out of chancery is
submitted to a jury, the jury must find that the facts involved exist
beyond a reasonable doubt. Though a departure from traditional
equity procedure, requiring a juvenile to be committed on the same
degree of proof required in a criminal proceeding would seem to be a
desirable result. This would be especially true when the juvenile is
adjudged delinquent on the basis of an act which would be criminal if
committed by an adult.
68
5Essentials of due process and fair treatment require that juveniles be accorded
the right to notice of the charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, a determination based on sworn testimony, and a quantum of proof of beyond
a reasonable doubt. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); In re Winship, go S.Ct. io68
(1970).
®Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard required in juvenile pro-
ceedings. In re Winship, go S. Ct. IO68 (1970); Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va.
335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946); § 16.1-214, which does not specifically require that the equit-
able standard be used, must be held to allow the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
to be used. Otherwise the statute would be invalid.
"Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 SE.2d 444 (1946). See also In re
Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, lo9 A.2d 523 (1954). In his dissent Justice Musmanno stated
that:
Even when the ill-starred child becomes an old man the record
will be there to haunt, plague and torment him. It will be an
ominous shadow following his tottering steps, it will stand by
his bed at night and it will hover over him when he dozes fitfully in
the dusk of his remaining day.
Id. at 529 (dissenting opinion).
12In re Winship, go S. Ct. 1o68 (197o). The Court took note of the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals' decision in Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335,
38 S.E.2d 444 (1946).
"The Sapreme Court of Illinois in In re Urbasek, 38 Ill.2d 535, 232 NE.2d 716
(1968), held that the reasonable doubt standard is required where the juvenile is
committed for acts which, if committed by an adult, would be criminal. However,
only the preponderance of the evidence standard was required in the truly civil
proceeding where the juvenile was adjudged dependent or neglected. The United
States Supreme Court, while not specifically acknowledging its acquiscence in the
differentiation between quasi-criminal and truly civil cases, has been careful to
point out that its decisions were involving quasi-criminal proceedings. See In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967); In re Winship, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1070 (1970).
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Many other problems arise in regard to handling a juvenile pro-
ceeding on appeal according to the procedure provided for in section
16.1-214. It is unclear from the wording of the statute how the trial on
appeal is initiated, and whether the juvenile's answer is evidence in his
favor. 64 It does appear, however, that on appeal the proceeding is a
trial de novo.65 This places the juvenile in an advantageous position as
far as pre-trial discovery is concerned. 66 In addition to what was ob-
tained in the original hearing, the juvenile may bring a cross-bill to
obtain facts from the Commonwealth's attorney which would aid in his
defense.67 On the other hand, a juvenile is protected from unlimited
discovery by virtue of In re Gault.6 8
Though section 16.1-214 seemingly grants a jury trial on issues of
fact, much of the procedure involved is ambiguous. The traditional
equity concepts and procedure must be altered in their application to
juvenile proceedings. Resolution of these problems is needed and
could be had by eliminating equity procedure in juvenile hearings alto-
6 'Traditionally in equity, a defendant's answer was evidence in his favor
which must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses, or one witness with
corroborating circumstances. See, e.g., Thornton v. Gordon, 41 Va. (2 Rob.) 719
(1844). The plaintiff could not deprive the defendant of his right to have his
answer considered as evidence on his behalf. See Care v. Corhan, 127 Va. 223,
1o3 SE. 699 (1920); Jones v. Abraham, 75 Va. 466 (1881). See also Powell v. Manson,
63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 177 (1872). This equity rule has now been changed by statute and
an answer has evidentiary value only when an answer under oath is demanded.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-213 (Repl. Vol. 1957); see generally Wilson v. Wilson, 136 Va.
643, ii8 S.E. 270 (1923). Thus, in a juvenile appeal, a demand for an answer under
oath would generally not be made. Otherwise, the truth of the petition would have
to be proven in a specific way-by the testimony of two witnesses, or one with
corroborating circumstances.
"See Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 162 Va. 787, 173 S.E. 543 (1934). A trial de
novo requires that the court hear the evidence as if it were exercising original
jurisdiction and make a new determination of guilt or innocence. See Gravely v.
Deeds, 185 Va. 662, 40 S.E.2d 175 (1946); Malouf v. City of Roanoke, 177 Va. 846,
13 S.E.2d 319 (1g4); Thomas Gemmell, Inc. v. Svea Fire & Life Ins. Co., 166 Va. 95,
184 S.E. 457 (1936).
'The hearing in the juvenile court would then be similar to a preliminary hear-
ing in a criminal case. VA. CODE ANN. § 19a-163. (Repl. Vol. 1969) provides that
where an accused has been arrested before being indicted, he has the right to a
preliminary hearing. Though not its principal purpose, such a hearing may serve as
a vehicle of pre-trial discovery. See United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 9o7 (1967).
"See Crockett v. Woods, 97 Va. 391, 34 S.E. 96 (1899); Scott v. Rowland, 82
Va. 484, 4 S.E. 595 (1887); Ragland v. Broadnax, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 401 (1877).
"387 US. 1 (1967). The United States Supreme Court in Gault held that a
juvenile is entitled to the right against self-incrimination. Limited discovery is
allowed, however. See WRIGuT, FEDERAL PRACtiCE AND PROCEDURE § 255 (1969).
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gether.09 The legislature also needs to specifically state whether or not
a juvenile is entitled to a jury trial. This first requires that a basic value
or policy judgment be made as to whether a juvenile should be given
the right to a jury trial.70 Most states do not provide for jury trials for
juveniles, either in the juvenile courts or on appeal,71 and there are
valid considerations to support this judgment. A jury trial would
bring a good deal more formality into the proceeding without provid-
ing a better fact-finding process. 7 2 Unequal and disparate decisions are
invited where the jury decides under the loose statutory formulae,
and attorneys react with more staging, effect and emotion.73 Conversely
there are other considerations which militate against denying a jury
trial to juveniles. Informal procedures may themselves be an obstacle
to effective treatment of the delinquent as they engender a feeling of in-
justice.74 Also, efforts to help must be based on an accurate determina-
tion of the facts and a judicial trial is the best method for determina-
tion of facts that our system has devised.75 However, once this value
judgment concerning juvenile jury trials is made, section 16.1-214
should be amended to resolve all ambiguity.
JAMES A. PsHILPorr, JR.
6'Juveniles within the court's jurisdiction as being dependent or neglected
might still be retained in equity proceedings. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-158(1) (Supp.
1970); In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 555, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1968). The question in such
cases is not a factual determination as to whether a juvenile has committed a
quasi-criminal act. It is primarily a discretional determination of whose custody
the child should be in for his own best interest.
nOWhether or not the legislature may make the policy judgment depends on




See, e.g., CAL. WEIX. & INST'NS CODE §§ 68o, 8oo (West 1966); ILL. REV. STAT.
Ch. 37, §§ 701-4, 704-8 (Supp. 197o); N.Y. CODE CGRe. PROC. §§ 913-1, 913-4, 519 (Mc-
Kinney 1958); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-28 5 , 7A-289 (1969); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 2151.35, 2151.52 (Baldwin 1968).
72TnE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, TASK FORCE REPORT 38.
W!d.
"'TnE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION 85 .
75Id.
